the document. 13 It is always possible that Regiam and the "auld lawes" were intended to be encompassed in the general expression "statutes of Parliament," or perhaps, alternatively, by the words "infallible and allowed customes and consuetudes." Supporting the latter possibility, one may note that such customs were described as governing "matters of discent and succession of Landes." This was not too implausible a description of the matter in Regiam still of current value around 1600. One may also note that Spottiswoode's Practicks (of around 1625-1637) directly cited Regiam only five times, each time concerning land or succession; two of those references occur in quotations from the Jus feudale of Thomas Craig and are not for current propositions of law. 14 In comparison, the same author, for example, cited Jean Papon's Recueil d'arrests notables des cours souverains de la France no less than twenty times on a wide range of topics. 15 By 1600, Regiam clearly had an understandably restricted utility as a direct source of current law.
The second interesting omission is that of any mention of or reference to the significance of the Canon law in Scotland. It is with this that this article will be primarily concerned. Of course, such an omission was not unprecedented. In the 1570s, John Leslie, Bishop of Ross, Senator of the College of Justice, gave an account of Scots law in his Historie of Scotland. Leslie had studied law in Poitiers, Toulouse, and Paris, before becoming Canonist 13 (Leiden, 1994) , 385. The absence of a mention of Regiam suggests to me that it is unlikely that Sir John Skene was the author of the Relation. 14 
Practicks of the Laws of Scotland, Observed and Collected by Sir Robert Spotiswoode of Pentland, President of the College of Justice, and Secretary of State to K. Charles the I. As Also, Abstracts Taken out of the Ancient Records of This Kingdom, whereby is declared the manner of Administring Justice in Civil Causes, before the College of Justice was Erected. And Propositions and Questions in Law Made by the same Author. With Memoirs of his Life and Trial For an alleg'd Crime of High Treason against the States: In the Pretended Parliament at St. Andrews, in
December 1645, and January 1646, ed. J. Spottiswoode (Edinburgh, 1706), 27 (twice) (bastards not lawful heirs), 143 (heir and heirships), 216 (morgagium), and 305 (reversion). The last two are embodied in quotations from T. Craig, Jus Feudale (Edinburgh, 1655), 172, or Jus Feudale, 3rd ed., ed. J. Baillie (Edinburgh, 1732), II.vi.27 and 26. All subsequent references to Craig will be to the third edition. 15 Spottiswoode (note 14), 5, 13, 14 (four times), 76, 78, 79, 95 (twice), 120, 126, 157, 185, 216 (twice) , 225, 227, 349. in the University of Aberdeen and then Official of that diocese. 16 Leslie wrote that Scots municipal law was partly in Latin and partly in the Scots language. The law book written in Latin was Regiam Majestatem, while, for Leslie, the rest of the books of the laws consisted of the acts of the Parliaments (written in Scots). He added: 17 Albeit heir sulde be vnderstandet, that this far to the lawis of the Realme we ar astricted, gif ony cummirsum or trubilsum cause fal out, as oft chances, quhilke can nocht be agriet be our cuntrey lawis, incontinent quhateuir is thocht necessar to pacifie this controuersie, is citet out of the Romane lawis.
This statement is comparable to that in the Relation, although it should be noted that Leslie here made no mention of ancient customs and the decisions of the courts.
One ought not to conclude too easily, however, that, perhaps due to the Reformation of religion in Scotland, Canon law had simply been rejected. For example, Leslie, as Bishop of Ross, remained true to the Roman Catholic faith and died abroad in Brussels. Furthermore, one can note that, writing around 1600, Thomas Craig still echoed Baldus' two hundred year-old view, when he stated that, where there was a conflict between the Canon law and the Civil law, the former was to be preferred, especially in those areas under the jurisdiction of the Commissary courts. This was so, even though Scotland had "shaken off the papal yoke." 18 The rest of this article will be devoted to considering and exploring the possible significance of the omission of the mention of Canon law in the document and the importance of this for our understanding of Scottish legal history.
The issue is fundamental for the modern historian of Scots law. It raises crucial questions about the appropriate framework 16 within which we ought to understand the history of Scots law and also about the nature of Scots law. Our current state of knowledge of Scottish legal history leaves much uncertain; much may always remain so. Any interpretative framework will be inevitably provisional. Yet, by focusing on this point we can see how appropriate competing frameworks may be.
In a volume honoring the memory of David Daube, the master of my master, to tease out the insights that may be gained from investigation of this issue seems especially fitting, even if, at first sight, only small differences in perhaps obscure texts seem at stake. Daube, however, always emphasized the importance of very close attention to texts. 19 His work has shown that it is often from investigation of such small points that greater understanding develops. I hope that this is so here, even if the conclusions reached will be relatively tentative.
I. Canon Law before the Court of Session
As a central court, the Court of Session developed out of the King's Council, which, by the late 15th century, was regularly hearing an increasing range of essentially civil cases, although initially declining to hear matters of fee and heritage. 20 With a significant number of Canon lawyers dealing with the legal business before the Council, it is no surprise that the Court adopted a version of Romano-Canonical procedure. 21 It is accordingly plausible that well-known commentaries on that procedure were consulted and cited for litigation before the Session. For example, a submission to arbitration by the Lords of Council in 1498 referred to a style in Durandus' Speculum Judiciale. 22 Indeed, it is even likely that citation of such Canonists was common, as the libraries collected by those active in the legal system at this time would suggest. 23 Unfortunately, the way in which the formal record of the Court was kept was such that clear indications of citation of Canonist works are infrequent.
Proceedings before the Lords of Council were in essence oral; it is evident, however, that the practice early developed of the production to the Lords of written exceptions and pleadings. The nature of the record of the proceedings of the Court means that it is rare for such written pleadings to have survived; but it is clear that they became relatively common in the 16th century and it is fair to suppose that this was how tricky legal and procedural arguments were commonly developed. 24 The survival of such a written document from 1503 provides good evidence of the nature of reference to the sources and literature of the Canon law before the Lords of Council prior to the erection of the College of Justice. This written pleading (described as "certane lawis" 25 ) was produced before the Lords of Council by the forespeaker for Alexander, Earl of Buchan. The King had claimed the Barony of Kingedward as successor to John Stewart, Earl of Buchan, and had raised a summons of error against the finding of an inquest that had retoured Alexander, Earl of Buchan, as heir to the Barony. The Earl sought reduction of the summons on the ground that he had been retoured heir, had been given sasine, and had paid the blenchferme reddendo to the sheriff and officers of the sheriffdom. 26 The written pleading first argued that the Earl's father, James, had had possession, time out of mind, with a title and bona fides. However, continuous possess- 31 Sinclair's Practicks shows that one of the most important works on procedure then used in Scotland was Panormitanus' commentaries on the Decretals. A few examples will suffice here. Panormitanus is found cited on the faith of instruments, on exceptions against witnesses, on whether an exception should be put to proof or not, on the authenticity of documents, on whether someone who promises sub fide sua has sworn an oath or not, on the impugning of public documents, on defects in documents. One could go on. 32 Other Canonists were similarly cited on such issues; for example, the less well-known writer Felinus Sandaeus was evidently also fairly regularly consulted. 33 As in 1503, Johannes de Ferrariis' work was still evidently found a useful authority on how libelled summonses should be framed, being cited in a case of spuilzie for the drafting of libels in such cases (in forma libelli in causa possessionis), while being relied on by the Lords in the reduction of an instrument of resignation of land, when one of the witnesses to the deed rejected its validity. 34 exceptions on writs had to produce them, and on when a pursuer had to produce writs on which he was founding. 35 Of course, legists such as Bartolus, Baldus, Jason de Mayno, Paulus de Castro, Alexander Tartagnus, Zasius, and others are also found cited, and there are numerous references to the Digest and Code, as well as to the Decretals; 36 yet, the overwhelming significance of Panormitanus on the Liber Extra, especially its second book, is evident on the most casual consultation of Sinclair's Practicks. Judged by citations, Bartolus was the only author who approached the significance of Panormitanus. 37 It is worth noting that Bishop Elphinstone of Aberdeen owned Panormitanus' commentaries on the Decretals, in a set made up of manuscript and printed editions. Possession of these works may have had importance for his work as a Canonist and Official; but they undoubtedly would have assisted him as a Lord Auditor and Lord of Council. 38 Examination of Sinclair's Practicks demonstrates the allprevailing significance of the ius commune in Scottish legal practice in this era. There can be no doubt that, in the 1540s, Scottish sources of law, such as statutes, customs, and Regiam Majestatem, were regarded as ius proprium in opposition to the ius commune. From this source we see Scots law as a largely unwritten customary system, cited imprecisely as "practick" or "custom," in contrast to ius, a term that nearly always refers to the ius commune, unless qualified in some way to indicate that Scots law is meant. Thus, "practica Scotie" is contrasted with "jus scriptum," and rules can be described as originating "de practica et municipali jure Scotie non scripto et consuetudinario." 39 The attitude revealed by the Practicks is important. It shows us the Lords preferring a disposition of the common law (in the sense of ius commune) to an alleged "consuetude of this realme" demonstrated by an earlier decision, because "thai culd nocht understand the consuetude allegit in the contrair to be trew in the selff, nor yit thair wes ony sic practik or consuetude." 40 A litigant argued explicitly in a case concerning restitution on the ground of 35 minority that "because the municipal law of the kingdom of Scotland did not decide this issue, so the Civil Law must be followed . . . since a casus omissus remains at the disposition of the ius commune." 41 I have discussed this elsewhere; I do not propose to go into it further here. 42 All that I wish to stress is that the Canon law was central to the ius commune in Scotland and hence central to legal practice before the Lords of Council and the Session in the first half of the 16th century. 43 It is evident, to give one example, that the Scottish delict of spuilzie, the most commonly litigated wrong in this period, was developed and interpreted by relying on the texts of the Decretals on the Canon law actio spolii with their commentators, such as Panormitanus. 44 I also suspect that the development of much of the Scots law on probative writs has been -at the least -strongly influenced by the practice of the Canonists. Practical requirements for training in Canon law as well as academic tradition thus lay behind the establishment of a royal lectureship "in the lawis" (that is, both the Canon and Civil laws) by Mary of Lorraine in the 1550s and Bishop Reid's bequest to 41 Id. at No. 444: "quod ius municipale regni Scotie hunc passum non determinabat, ideo sequenda esse iura civilia . . . quia casus omissus remanet in dispositione iuris communis." I am here following Murray (note 27), 101-2, though I have varied his translation. 42 found a school "for the teching of the civile and canon lawis" in Edinburgh. As both a Senator and then President of the College of Justice, Reid was well placed to recognize the needs of the developing legal profession. 45 
II. The Ius Commune and Practice before the Court of Session
In 1596, the Lords of Session issued an Act of Sederunt to regulate the practice of parties and their advocates soliciting the Lords outside the Court to "inform" them of their arguments on the case. 46 The attempt to "inform" the judges is not to be taken as evidence of corruption; rather, it reflects the procedure that had developed by this date before the Court of Session, whereby matters initially coming before its Outer House before a single Lord (sitting as the Lord Ordinary) in cases of difficulty could be reported to the whole Lords sitting in the Inner House for decision. When the Lord Ordinary sitting in the Outer House reported a matter to the Inner House for decision, the parties were understandably anxious to inform the Lords of their views on the law. This was because the Lord Ordinary reported the cause between eight and nine in the morning before clients and their lawyers were present. That is, lawyers were not allowed to argue the issue before the Inner House; nor were they or their clients allowed to be present. The judges in the Inner House would then discuss the matter among themselves and then vote; all such advisings were still in private. The Ordinary would then report the decision in the Outer House. 47 After emphasizing that parties and their agents should not solicit the Lords outside the Court because the report from the Outer House was sufficient information, and providing the penalty of suspension for any advocate who did so and other penalties for the litigants, the Act provided, "for better satisfactioun of the pairteis quhais actionis being weichtie or intricate," that each Lord should appoint a time when he or a particular servant would receive "the informatioun of the causis in wreitt." In return, the Lords promised that they would "try quhat is prescryveit or de- 45 cidet thairanent, als weill be the common law as be the municipall law or practick of this realme." 48 I have already pointed out that it was quite common for the Lords to receive written argument or to require that parties reduce their answers, replies, duplies and so on to written form, as a case progressed from the libelled summons, through the proponing of dilatory and peremptory exceptions, towards litiscontestatio. In these circumstances, the extension of written argument to such informations was in line with general practice before the Session. Indeed, in 1626, "Directions . . . for ordering of the Session" instructed: "That all Causes of importance and difficulty be pleaded by Writ, and Subscribed by the Partie's Advocat." 49 Written informations were the obvious way to deal with this problem of inconvenient solicitation of the Lords. What is important is that the Lords in this Act of Sederunt stated that they would assess the arguments in the written information by the "common law" as well as by "the muncipall law or practick of this realme." It is probable that "municipall law" is to be understood here as referring to the Scottish statutes, and "practick" as referring to Scottish custom and the practice of the court. The term "common law" must thus have been a reference to the ius commune, the Canon law and the Civil law as constituting a universally applicable system throughout Christendom. The Scots judges were still willing to draw on this common law, the utrumque ius, to help resolve difficulties in Scottish litigation, whether or not there was, in any sense, a lacuna in the law.
Yet, we must note that the Relation of the Manner of Judicatores of Scotland did not refer to the ius commune, but only to "the ymperiall civill lawe." Why was this? One strong possibility is that the author was concerned to avoid any confusion with the term "common law," as understood by his English reader. That in Scotland reference was made to the Civil law was well understood by many contemporary English lawyers. In fact, one of the major English grounds for objections to a union of the laws with Scot- 48 Acts of Sederunt (note 46), 26-27 (13 July 1596). While "common law" can be used in a variety of senses, it is clear that here it is used in contrast to ius proprium. 49 Spottiswoode (note 14), 368. The "Directions" also call for the enforcement of the Act of Sederunt of 1596. Id. The further elaboration of the development of written pleadings is outside the scope of this paper, but it may be noted that by 1677 it could be stated that such "written informations are become ordinary": Acts of Sederunt (note 46), 135 (6 Nov. 1677).
land was that Scots law was a form of Civil law. 50 Just to refer to Civil law would have sufficed in this short explanation of the Scottish courts and their operation. Moreover, reference to reliance on Canon law could even have raised further alarms for English lawyers.
Another possibility, the one that I wish to explore further here, is that what was said in the Relation reflected how Scottish practice had developed since the 1540s. That is, the Canon law component of the ius commune either had become less significant in legal practice, or the nature of its use had changed. In either case, this might even affect how we should understand the Act of Sederunt of 1596.
In the current state of knowledge of the Court records and collections of practicks, it is difficult to address the question of whether or not there had been a move away from reliance on Canon law or, perhaps rather, on Canonist authors, in practice before the Session. Also, the nature of the formal records of the Session has meant that information about the sources relied on in legal argument has not survived in a systematic form. An entirely satisfactory answer to the question posed cannot be given.
There are, however, two resources that can be drawn on to consider the problem. The first is Thomas Craig's Jus feudale, written about 1600. 51 Craig had been educated at St. Andrews and then in France, certainly at Paris, but perhaps also elsewhere, before pursuing a successful career as an advocate. 52 Craig's work might seem limited in scope, but it was in fact wider in its interests than its title would initially suggest. Moreover, as the first to give a systematic account of Scots law, Craig was forced to address many issues about the sources of the law used in practice, making Jus feudale, in that respect, a particularly valu- 50 able work for this study. 53 The second resource is the Practicks of the Law of Scotland, collected by Sir Robert Spottiswoode of Newabbey from the 1620s to the 1640s. 54 According to his grandson, Spottiswoode was educated in Glasgow and Oxford, before pursuing legal study in Continental Europe, apparently primarily in France, although he also travelled widely. He was initially appointed an Extraordinary Lord of Session, then an ordinary Lord, and finally President of the Session. 55 The Practicks is an important source of information about the sources relied on in legal practice in the first half of the 17th century. While these two authors allow us to explore the issue satisfactorily, I shall also make some remarks on the work of Sir John Skene, Craig's contemporary.
A note of caution should be inserted here. We should not expect to find a complete rejection of Canon law and literature; citation of it is to be found up until the beginning of the 19th century, especially in consistorial issues. Indeed, at the very period when the Relation was written, of those advocates (two-thirds) admitted because of their university-training in law, most probably held degrees in both Civil and Canon law. 56 The practicing bar thus continued to be familiar with the sources and literature of the Canon law. What we are looking for is something more nuanced, perhaps a reduction in the frequency of references to Canon law, with a generally lesser reliance on it and its commentators in litigation outside the consistorial field.
III. Craig's Sources and his Concept of Ius Commune
The first aspect of Craig's Jus feudale that we should examine is the sources on which he relied. The most obvious development from the range of citations found in Sinclair' frequent reference to Humanist authors. 57 In particular, François Hotman was the most cited Humanist author, with twenty-five references; but other noted Humanists cited, with between one and fourteen references, were Andrea Alciato, Ulrich Zasius, Guillaume Budé, and Jacques Cujas. 58 As well as such Humanist authors, however, Craig also cited some authors of the older ius commune; Bartolus and Baldus, for example, were each cited as often as Hotman. 59 Craig nonetheless distinguished between the older interpreters, culminating in Decio, the teacher of Alciato, and the new interpreters, such as Cujas. 60 64 Craig also cited Pierre Rebuffi, commonly described as a Canonist, four times; 65 the references, however, were not to Rebuffi's works on Canon law. There was an isolated reference to Durandus. 66 In general, however, one can say that Craig had not openly drawn on writers on Canon law.
If, given the nature of Jus feudale, the paucity of references to Canonists may to some extent be expected, it is worth pointing out that Craig nonetheless had several discussions of and allusions to Canon law and did cite its sources, though relatively infrequently. To examine these references is informative. The third title of the first book is De Juris Canonici Origine, Progressu, & quis apud nos ejus usus. There are to be found comments such as that, while the decisions of the Roman Rota had no greater authority than those of the Parlement of Paris or that of Toulouse, the stature of the judges made those decisions have particularly great weight if not the force of Canons. 67 Elsewhere, there were quite regular references to Canon law. Most of these, however, related to the particular sphere of the Catholic church and its courts or to the Scottish ecclesiastical courts. A few examples will suffice. There was a discussion of the effect of a grant of a feu by the Pope to an excommunicated person. 68 The title Quae res in feudum dari possint took as its point of departure the divisions of property found in Justinian's Institutes, so that there was a discussion of res sacrae and res religiosae that inevitably touched on ecclesiastical issues, the feuing of church lands, and, notably, teinds. 69 Occasional comparative remarks were made, such as that "in the Canon law, which is close to ours, this is the position" or that "bad Latin does not vitiate a princely rescript according to the Canon law, nor does it [vitiate] charters among us." 70 There were other scattered remarks on Canon law. Some examples follow. Craig noted the rule of Canon law on oaths and usurious agreements. 71 He recalled a debate among Canonists on whether resignations of benefices required a public instrument. 72 At one point he commented that three witnesses were required in certain circumstances by the ius Civile, but two by the ius Can-onicum. 73 In the title De his quae impediunt Successionem, bastardy was discussed and there was considerable general reference to Canon law, including the specific citation of Panormitanus and Hostiensis already noted. 74 In discussing the expiry of the time limit to exercise a ius protimeseos, he noted that what it was to be absent without fraud or blame on public business could be found in the Canon law. 75 He commented elsewhere that a Scottish practice was "secundum juris Canonici regulas." 76 In general, a reading of Craig thus suggests that Canon law now had little continuing impact on the development of Scots law, in comparison with the era of Sinclair, although Craig was well aware of its importance.
To find an explanation of this changed attitude to Canon law, we need to explore Craig's approach to the idea of a ius commune. In fact, we shall see that Craig had developed an approach to the ius commune notably different from that found in Sinclair's Practicks; this helps explain his attitude to Canon law, an attitude that is not solely to be attributed to the content and scope of his work. We can approach this issue by examining his discussion of the hierarchy of sources of law and their links with his ideas of sovereignty.
Craig pointed out in his title Quando jus Feudale in Scotiam pervenerit, & quo jure hodie Scoti utuntur that the Scots and
English laws on feus had much in common, adding, however, that one should not thereby draw the conclusion that the Scots had once been subject to the English. This was because of the difference between ius and leges. The Scots might use the same ius as the English, but they did not use the same leges. Leges were made by magistrates without a superior and bound those subject to them; ius originated in nature. 77 Legislation was thus authoritative because enacted by a sovereign power; ius derived its authority from nature. It is not surprising to note that Craig's political thinking was influenced by that of Jean Bodin, whom he cited several times, and whose influence can be traced beyond such references. 78 In his discussions of the difference between ius and leges and his linking of the latter to sovereignty, Craig had commented: "Thus, jus Naturale, jus Gentium, thus jus Commune is said to be 73 Id. at II.vii.20. 74 Id. at II.xviii. 75 Id. at III.iv.13. 76 Id. at III.vi.19. 77 Id. at I.viii.4. 78 Id. at I.i.8; I.ii.13; I.iii.6; I.vii.3; I.xii.6; II.ii.2; II.xiii.38. that which is common to almost all peoples, as if a certain innate reason of equity ruling in the souls of men." 79 He accordingly set out a hierarchy of law, stating that there were three types of ius: ius Naturale; ius Gentium; and ius Civile. 80 The first was the good and the just (bonum et aequum) derived from the reason and equity of ius inborn in us; against this ius, neither statutes of the kingdom, nor prescription of the longest time, nor custom had any argumentative force. 81 The ius Gentium was what was observed after the natural inborn reason and understanding of equity and good. What all nations observed ought to have force with us, notwithstanding the ius Civile or Municipale. He noted that all nominate and innominate contracts originated in the ius Gentium. In dealing with foreigners this ius Gentium ought to be followed, he said, despite any specific statute of the kingdom; it likewise had force among citizens, unless there was a special lex or statute contrary to it. 82 The third type of ius was the ius proprium or Civile of each people. Thus, "after the jus Naturale and that which today is common to almost all nations, in order to resolve controversies and any difficulty, the first recourse ought to be to our jus scriptum, should there be any." 83 Our ius scriptum was the statutes and constitutions that had been enacted by the Three Estates of the kingdom with the consent of the Prince: "this was the jus proprium of the kingdom." 84 On the basis of this analysis, Craig then stated that, when a problem appeared, the ius scriptum, the ius proprium of the kingdom, had to be investigated, although it was important to recognize that its applicability could have been affected by the doctrine of desuetude. Other than such statutes, there was no certain and fixed ius scriptum in Scotland, as the statutes of the Privy Council did not have the force of lex; Craig's view was the same regarding enactments of conventions of Estates. 85 After dismissing the books of Regiam Majestatem, Craig reiterated that our only ius proprium scriptum was the legislation of Parliament. Thus, if any controversy arose, it was necessary to see first what was in the acts of Parliament, and the decision ought to be made according to them "as if according to the jus proprium of the kingdom." 86 Lack- 79 Id. at I.viii.4. 80 Id. at I.viii.6 81 Id. at I.viii.7. 82 Id. at I.viii.8. 83 Id. at I.viii.8. 84 Id. at I.viii.9. 85 Id. at I.viii.9 and 10. 86 Id. at I.viii.11-12. On Craig's view of Regiam, see Cairns, Fergus, and MacQueen (note 11), 63-64.
ing such ius proprium, attention was then paid to the custom of uninterrupted res iudicata, called "practick." Among all peoples, he wrote, custom was given the name of law and law was said to be constituted by custom. Therefore the second locus for resolving causes was by custom. But this, no matter how ancient, could never be followed if against ius proprium scriptum. Whenever custom was stated to prevail against written law, this, said Craig, was to be understood as referring to the Roman leges. Custom sometimes interpreted a law, but did not overthrow it. 87 If ius proprium and custom failed, then there should be arguments by analogy, as the same reasoning should be applied if it led to the same utility; nor should what neighboring nations did be neglected in similar circumstances (so long as they used the same ius) and we should turn to their customs, if we lacked ius proprium and custom. 88 If, however, a novus casus arose that was covered neither by ius scriptum nor by custom, nor by other resources already noted, and a solution was found in the ius Feudale, it should be preferred both to the ius Pontificium and to the ius Civile. This reflected Craig's argument that the ultimate historical origin of Scots law was in the ius Feudale, so that it was appropriate to go back to the original source. 89 Finally, Craig wrote: 90 If neither from the acts of parliament, nor from judicial custom, nor the jus Feudale, can it be resolved what ought to be done in some new question that has occurred, then recourse must be made to the jus Civile. . . . And in our court, if anything hard, if anything troublesome comes up, the solution of it is to be sought from the jus Civile: if, however, in anything there have been innovations through the jus Pontificium or Canonicum (and some scholars have collected together all things in which the jus Civile and the jus Canonicum disagree), in such matters the jus Pontificium is to be preferred by us, particularly where it concerns the administration of the Church, or scandal (as Canonists say), where there is danger to the soul. 87 Craig (note 14), I.viii.13-14. Craig is using "locus" here in a technical sense derived from the study of rhetoric, namely as a "sedes argumentorum." See, This echoes the remark Craig made earlier in his work, where he had also stated that, in areas of conflict between the Civil law and the Canon law, the latter was to be preferred. In this earlier reference, he expanded and explained his comment, stating that, always subject to the requirements of sound religion, and granting that we had thrown off the Pontifical yoke, we followed the ius Pontificium concerning the administration of the Church as regards those who have the care of souls, benefices, ecclesiastical cases, patronage, testaments, the contracting or dissolution of marriage, and legitimacy, making appropriate allowance for changed circumstances. These matters were referred to the ecclesiastical judge, the Commissary, who had inherited the jurisdiction of the old ecclesiastic courts, most notably those of the Bishop's Officials. 91 Craig thus does not appear exactly to envisage in Scotland the role of Canon law found in the older ius commune, as found in Sinclair's Practicks. While he did consider that where Canon law and Civil law conflicted the former was generally preferred, he did qualify the use of Canon law as being largely confined to the jurisdiction that succeeded the old ecclesiastical courts. Indeed, as shown above, this was indeed the context of many of Craig's own references to Canon law. His claim that it was preferred generally to Civil law when there was a conflict was most probably alluding to matters such as the likelihood that aspects of the strict Roman rules on contracts may not have been followed. For Craig, as for the author of the Relation, Scottish ius proprium was the statutes -the municipal law, as the anonymous author put it. A casus omissus was referred to the ius Civile. The decisions of the courts did have a role as representing custom.
It is easy to see why this was so for Craig. As noted, he related the authority of law to sovereignty. As the law of the Papacy, Canon law had no authority. Indeed, the Pope was probably the Anti-Christ in Craig's view. 92 As law, Canon law had problems of legitimacy, except so far as it was accepted in practice. It was, however, easy to justify the use of Roman law. Craig argued that in Scotland "we are bound by Roman laws only so far as they are congruent with the laws of nature and right reason." He added: 93 Yet surely there is no broader seedbed of natural equity, no more fertile field of articulated reasoning and arguments 91 Id. at I.iii.24. 92 Id. at I.iii.23. 93 Id. at I.ii.14. Roman law for Craig was thus valid as a subsidiary law representing the ius Naturale. This raises two interesting points. First, the ius Naturale, according to Craig, had a higher authority than the ius proprium and neither a statute, nor long prescription, nor custom should have greater argumentative force than it. Secondly, for Craig, Scotland's ius proprium was the legislation of Parliament. He stressed, however, that there was very little written law in Scotland; 94 Scotland's ius proprium was very restricted indeed, and hence the scope for the ius Civile was large. Craig thus wrote: 95 We accordingly follow the decisions or rules of the Civil law chiefly in the administration of moveable property, granted that each nation will have employed its own particular forms of process. And we use our own forms of actions which are not entirely different from the Civil law; we state, however, that the Civil law must entirely be followed, in pacts, transactions, restitution, decisions or (as we now say) arbitrations, servitudes, contracts both bonae fidei and stricti iuris as well as nominate and innominate, evictions, pledges, tutory, legacies, actions, exceptions, obligations, and finally in the punishing of wrongs: and to say truly, this Civil law so permeates all our law suits and about all business that scarcely no issue or no type of case arises in which its authority and particular practice is not plainly obvious: whenever anything difficult arises in court or law suits, the solution of it is sought thence.
Of course, this was not the Roman law of Justinian; it was that developed by the ius commune, even influenced by Canonist principles of equity and good faith, and in some instances "abrogated" by doctrines taken from the Canon law. Its authority was as natural law.
One may finally note that, when Craig used the term ius commune, he did not use it in quite the sense understood by Sinclair. For Craig, the great natural equity of the ius Civile shone forth among so many peoples that it was deservedly called the ius 94 Id. 95 Id. commune. 96 Craig identified the ius commune with the ius Gentium, and the ius Civile, because of its natural equity and representation of ius Naturale, had such widespread use that it truly constituted the ius commune. Craig's ius commune was no longer that based on the almost unexamined authority of the utrumque ius; rather, it was founded on the ius Gentium and ius Naturale. So far as the Civil law embodied this, and only so far, it could be regarded as ius commune binding on all nations.
IV. Ius Commune after Craig
Craig's new understanding of the concept of ius commune was a development of profound importance, marking a significant change from the epoch of Sinclair. He had in fact propounded a view of ius commune potentially highly subversive of the traditional role of the utrumque ius in Scotland. Of course, older modes of thinking remained embedded in his work: witness his repetition (twice) of the traditional view that when there was a conflict between the Civil and the Canon law the view of the latter was preferred. 97 Baldus, for example, had written the same. 98 It is difficult to see why this should be so if Civil law was authoritative only as natural equity. This perhaps explains why to this view he added the rider that this preference for the Canon law was "particularly where it concerns the administration of the church" and where the Commissary had jurisdiction. 99 It is impossible in our current state of knowledge to know to what extent Craig's contemporaries shared this vision. For example, it is evident that Sir John Skene saw Scots law as related to the more universal systems of Civil and Canon law. Skene had been educated in law at Wittenberg under the Humanist Matthäus Wesenbeck. 100 The Annotationes to his Latin edition of Regiam Majestatem drew extensively on the learning of the utrumque ius. These notes varied between the comparative, the etymological, and the historical. Skene saw the Canon law (along with the Civil, the Norman, and the English) as helping to confirm readings in Regiam; he also claimed to point out where individual leges were derived from or agreed with the Civil, Canon, or Norman laws. 101 A similar approach is found in his work De ver-borum significatione. 102 Skene cited a broad range of sources in many ways comparable to those cited by Craig: one can thus note many Humanists. How exactly Skene understood the relationship between Scots law and the more universal systems of law is not yet entirely clear; but it seems unlikely that he had radical views on the ius commune comparable to those of Craig. Nonetheless, he undoubtedly favored the Civil law over the Canon in citations of the utrumque ius (in his notes to Regiam, the most cited author is Bartolus) and his pattern of citations in this respect is very similar to that of Craig. It seems likely that Skene's view of the relationship between Scots law and the ius commune (however understood), if not that of Craig, was also not that of Sinclair.
Spottiswoode's Practicks allows us to explore the point more thoroughly by examining the law in practice and how it was understood in a way that Skene's works do not permit. The collection is not directly comparable with that of Sinclair, as it is not a type of "journal" of the court, although there is extensive discussion of some cases. Rather, it contains an account, organized alphabetically, of various areas of law, in some of which there is a strong focus on the practice of the court. Some of the cases discussed were drawn from Spottiswoode's own experience, others have been taken from different collections and works. Hector McKechnie, in his somewhat unsatisfactory terminology, accordingly classified the volume as one of "digest" rather than "decision" practicks. 103 The editor, Spottiswoode's grandson, described it as "a Collection of Materials for a Pandect of the Scots law." 104 Whether or not Spottiswoode intended to compose a "pandect," presumably meaning a work somewhat of the nature of Stair's later Institutions of the Law of Scotland (1681), this does indeed give more of a sense of what the work is like than the classification "digest practicks." The contents of each title often resemble the type of collection one might associate with a lawyer's commonplace-book, with a whole array of different material in either Scots or Latin -quotations, accounts of cases, references to statutes and to the Civil law -gathered together with little in the way of discernible structure or order. One could easily imagine it was a collection made with a view to a further purpose.
Turning to the materials collected by Spottiswoode, as well as court decisions, the most important materials on Scots law for him were Craig's Jus feudale and Balfour's Practicks, both of which were extensively quoted. 105 Neither of these were yet printed at the time Spottiswoode collected his materials together. The work also contains, often long, apparent quotations in Latin, not all of which have been traced to an author, supposing they were not Spottiswoode's own composition (as seems unlikely). There are many of these on a whole variety of topics and they usually embody Civil law. Further research may trace a source for some of them at least. The citations, even when they are second hand, reveal the type of material used by and familiar to those in practice, and on which the members of the Court of Session will have relied to construct their decisions and understanding of Scots law. Further, there are sometimes, in Spottiswoode's discussion of a case, whether based on his own experience on the bench or drawn from another source, indications of the reasons in law for the decision. In all of this it is important to compare the range and nature of Spottiswoode's citations of sources of the ius commune with those noted in Sinclair's Practicks.
The first point to make is that there would appear to have been only two direct citations of the texts of Canon law; in contrast, direct citations of the texts of Roman law were quite common, though, of course, tending to cluster in certain titles. The first citation of Canon law was in Spottiswoode's title on "Contracts and Obligations," where the examples he gave of individuals "forbidden by law to Contract" were "Monks and Friars." His authority for this was the Liber Sextus, the terms of the relevant provisions of which he paraphrased in Latin. 106 He also then wrote that it was "said in the Canon Law, Monachus habens aliquid de proprio sepeliri debet in sterquilinio." 107 This, of course, cannot be an account of law as practiced in Scotland, since there were no longer monks or friars. In the title on "Kirk Men and Kirk Patrimony," he discussed the case of Erskine v. Pitcairn (1566) ; in his report of that case, there was a reference to Canon law, again to the Liber Sextus. 108 That these two were the only direct citations of the Corpus iuris canonici in the whole work indicates the slight role that Spottiswoode was willing to attribute to it. 109 Moreover, one related to a matter that could not be the law in Scotland any longer; both concerned issues directly connected to the Canon law proper.
Turning to authors, we can note that no citations of any major Canonist authors of the classical period of Canon law are to be found, and this despite titles on topics such as bastardy, marriage, and tiends. Thus, Panormitanus, so important for Sinclair, was nowhere cited. 110 In the title "Kirk Men and Kirk-Patrimony," Hostiensis was mentioned in a lengthy Latin passage (a quotation?); but this was not a citation of the works of the Canonist. 111 In fact, like Craig, Spottiswoode had a knowledge of Canon law (as his French education would lead one to expect) and he made a number of general allusions and references to it similar to those found in the earlier author. Thus, ius Pontificium was referred to in his title De praescriptione & usucapione; 112 similarly he stated that there "are likeways Canon-Law Actions as Spuilzie of Teinds, wrongous intromissions there-with, for payment of Teind-Duties, Testaments and Executries." 113 In his title "Criminal matters" he reported that under Civil law a wife was not admitted in accusing her husband of adultery, but "jus Canonicum id permittit." 114 Further, it is obvious in reading parts of the Practicks that doctrines of Canon law underpinned the thinking they contain. Nonetheless it is the virtual lack of any citations of that law and its commentators that is most obvious.
It is easy to pick an example to demonstrate this further. Examination of Sinclair's Practicks shows particularly extensive use of Canon law and its commentators in interpreting and developing the Scottish action of spuilzie. It is thus particularly notable that, in Spottiswoode's title "Ejection and Spoliation," there was no direct citation of Canon law sources or authors. 115 This is particularly telling, given that much of the doctrine there discussed, such as "oportet spoliatum semel restitui, antequam spo-109 I am fairly confident that these are the only direct citations of Canon law texts; I should point out, however, that it is not always easy either to identify citations or to identify their nature. 110 In the following, I have counted references. While I have I have tried to ensure accuracy, by their very nature there will be some mistakes. These are unlikely to alter the balance of comparative citations, which is more important than total figures. 111 120 What one finds then is remarkably little mention of more modern Canonists. The two English writers were roughly contemporary with Spottiswoode and his references to them probably were a reflection of his period at Oxford, just as were those to, for example, Coke's Institute and to Bracton. 121 In contrast, reliance on works that can easily be described as on Civil law, as well as citation of the Corpus iuris civilis, was much more frequent. There was a quotation from the Commentaria iuris civilis of Franciscus Connanus in the title on servi-116 "The thing taken ought to be restored at once, before the taker is able to acquire ownership of it on some other ground." 117 127 The Consilia of Ioannes Petrus Surdus were relied on three times. 128 It is obvious that, for preference, Spottiswoode cited relatively contemporary, indeed modern, Civilian works on substantive law and that, among the authors he preferred, Humanists tended to predominate. 129 One can trace citations of older authors: Baldus was cited five times and Jason de Mayno once. 130 All of these citations occurred, however, in quotations, all but one clearly from Craig's Jus feudale. There is no reason to believe that Spottiswoode had directly consulted them in compiling the relevant titles of his Practicks. Actual use appears to have been made of Bartolus. He was once noted as having been followed by the Court of sionum omnium probationum quae in utroque foro quotidie versantur (once). 142 The last two works were much more modern than the first two.
Spottiswoode, in contrast to Sinclair, had a much richer body of Scottish material available for use: Craig, Balfour, Skene's edition of the statutes, Skene's edition of Regiam and the "auld lawes," Skene's De verborum, and collections of cases, and he made use of all of these. 143 Further, given that Spottiswoode drew on his experience as a judge in compiling the Practicks, discussion of decisions necessarily loomed very large in his account of the law. The overall picture of Scottish law and legal practice in the first half of the 17th century to be drawn from Spottiswoode's Practicks is thus of a legal system where the substantive municipal law was seen as found in statutes, decisions, and authoritative legal writings.
The works of the ius commune did not have quite the same overwhelming dominance in Spottiswoode's Practicks as in the collection of Sinclair, except in the area of procedure and practice; this said, in many areas of law, there was significant reliance on Roman legal sources, which were extensively cited, and modern authors, including Humanists, on the Roman law. Moreover, where works were cited on substantive issues, they were usually works of Roman law. In this sense, in Spottiswoode's approach to the ius commune, Canon law had been overwhelmed by Civil law. Further, one gains the impression that the types of literature of the ius commune that most interested Spottiswoode were collections of court decisions and studies of court practice, such as the contemporary work of Antoine Favre, Codex Fabrianus definitionum forensium, et rerum in sacro Sabaudiae Senatus tractatarum, ad ordinem titulorum Codicis Justinianei, quantum fieri potuit, ad usum forensem accommodatus et in novem libros distributus (cited once) 144 and the Rerum judicatarum, libri IIII of Annaeus Robertus (cited eleven times). 145 Even here, one can note that, in the extensive reliance on decisions of other jurisdictions in the Practicks, Spottiswoode favored secular over ecclesiastic court reports. It was only in the works used in procedure, on how to draw libels and on the progress of actions through the courts, that Spottiswoode made much use of works that pay much attention to the Canon law. In all, however, what evidently interested Spottiswoode most as a judge and writer of Practicks were 142 Id. at 240. 143 See Cairns, "Historical Introduction" (note 7), 95-98. 144 Spottiswoode (note 14), 231. 145 Id. at 156, 212, 228 (three times), 249, 295 (twice), 312, 337. the works of practici in the ius commune and the commentators on Roman law. Substantive material on the Canon law held little demonstrable interest for him, though he obviously had some knowledge of it and its literature.
While Spottiswoode had much more Scottish material available to him than Sinclair, there nonetheless were areas of law where, under his headings, Roman law or Civilian authors or case reports from outside Scotland were used exclusively, with no mention of Scottish material whatsoever. An example would be the title on negotiorum gestio. 146 There are also some titles, such as those on actions, dolus and fraus, pacts, and summons and libel, where Civilian or ius commune material predominates or is a very major portion of the material collected. 147 There are clearly areas where Scots law was starting to develop on the basis of the Civilian material, while Civilian material was nearly universally used to interpret Scots law directly or by analogy. For example, Spottiswoode reports the pleading in an action of removing, in which the pursuer's triply, based on C.4. 65.25 , was accepted by the Lords. 148 Another fine example of reliance on Civilian thinking came in Sharp v. Sharp (1631), where the pursuers sought reduction of an entail. By a bond, two sons had obliged themselves to entail their land on each other failing heirs male of their bodies. The daughters of one son sought reduction of the entail on the ground it was the product of a "nudum pactum, neque traditione, neque ulla alia re vestitutum" or a "contractus innominatus." The case caused the court considerable difficulty and the judges considered the "Process which was given in by Answers and Replys, &c in writ" for four days, before deciding that the "Bond was not nudum pactum, but a perfect stipulation between the two parties, whereof none of them could repent themselves thereafter without the others [sic] consent." 149 In this context it is perhaps worth pointing out that Spottiswoode's quotations from Cujas on pacts show an approach that was quite at variance from Canon law and, indeed, later Scots law. Sharp v. Sharp has come to be seen as significant in Scots law's move towards the Canon law's position. 150 For Spottiswoode, as for Craig, the "common law" was coming to appear as the ius civile rather than as the utrumque ius. Thus, in his title Dominium. De acquirendo, et amittendo rerum dominio, he reported a case (the parties were unnamed) in which a pursuer was trying to get a woman to remove under a tack. She claimed a heritable right. The pursuer argued in his triply "by the common Law," citing C.4. 65 .25, which stated that if anyone had received land or something else under a lease, the property had to be restored before they could litigate over ownership. Accordingly, the "Lords decerned her to flit and remove, without prejudice to her heritable Right in judicio petitorio." 151 He noted that Ballenden v. Mackmath (1628), a case on restitutio in integrum, "was judg'd conform to the common Law." For this he cited D. 4.4.19 . 152 In the case of Birkhead v. Nairn in the title De Satisdando, Spottiswoode noted that the defender (unsuccessfully) asked the Court to require the pursuer to give caution, "to answer him for what he had to lay to his Charge conform to the common Law." For this C.2.57.1 was cited. 153 
V. Conclusion
The Relation of the Manner of Judicatores of Scotland was written at a crucial time in the history of Scots law, when James VI had inherited the throne of England and had proposed various projects of unification, including that of the laws. 154 Commissions to consider a union of the laws were appointed by both Parliaments, with the Scots Commissioners instructed to protect "the fundamentall lawes, Ancient privilegeis, offices and liberteis of this kingdome." 155 There was a considerable pamphlet debate in which a variety of different views were urged. 156 Some thought that union would be easily achieved as the laws were fundamentally similar; others were much more sceptical, including those
